Cleveland State University

EngagedScholarship@CSU
Sociology & Criminology Faculty Publications

Sociology & Criminology Department

7-1976

Certainty of Arrest and Crime Rates for Major Felonies: Research
Note
William C. Bailey
Cleveland State University, w.bailey@csuohio.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clsoc_crim_facpub
Part of the Criminology Commons, and the Social Control, Law, Crime, and Deviance Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!

Publisher's Statement
(c) 1976 Sage Publications
Original Citation
Bailey, W. C. (1976). Certainty of Arrest and Crime Rates for Major Felonies: A Research Note. Journal of
Research in Crime and Delinquency, 13, 2, 145-154.

Repository Citation

Bailey, William C., "Certainty of Arrest and Crime Rates for Major Felonies: Research Note" (1976). Sociology &
Criminology Faculty Publications. 68.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clsoc_crim_facpub/68
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Sociology & Criminology Department at
EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sociology & Criminology Faculty Publications by
an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact
library.es@csuohio.edu.

CERTAINTY OF ARREST AND CRIME RATES FOR MAJOR FELONIES:
A RESEARCH NOTE
William C. Bailey, Cleveland State University

This article was originally published in:
Bailey, William C. (1976). Certainty of Arrest and Crime Rates for Major Felonies: A Research Note.
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 13, 145-154.
Post-print standardized by MSL Academic Endeavors, the imprint of the Michael Schwartz Library
at Cleveland State University, 2013

Certainty of Arrest and Crime Rates for
Major Felonies: A Research Note
WILLIAM C. BAILEY
The Cleveland State University

A recent investigation by Tittle and Rowe (1974) examining the
deterrent effect of the certainty of arrest on felony rates in Florida is
briefly summarized and critiqued. Examination shows their analysis to
suffer from serious theoretical and methodological limitations. To extend
their investigation and thus better understand the deterrent effect of
arrest we examine the relationship between arrest rates and offense rates
for cities and counties of Florida for seven major felonies. Analysis lends
general support to the deterrence argument, but shows that the effect of
arrest is not uniform for each offense, with different levels of arrest
(certainty of apprehension) required to reduce rates for different crimes.

IN

A RECENT ARTICLE,

Rowe

(1974) provide

Tittle and
a further

examination of the deterrent effect
of certainty of punishment on offense rates. In an attempt to extend
previous analyses they examine (1)
the effect of arrest clearance rates on
offense rates, rather than focusing
upon imprisonment as have others
(Gibbs, 1968; Tittle, 1969; Chiricos
and Waldo, 1970; Logan, 1972;
Bailey, Martin and Gray, 1974), (2)
the certainty-rate relationship for
smaller and presumably more
homogeneous geographic units (cities
and counties) than in previous
analyses which have focused upon
states

(Gibbs, 1968; Tittle, 1969;

Chiricos and Waldo, 1970; Logan,
1972; Bailey, Martin and Gray,
1974), and (3) the possible spuriousness of the certainty-rate relationship
by controlling for a number of socioeconomic and demographic factors
associated with crime.

The first step of their
to construct scatter

each unit

analysis was
diagrams locating

(cities and counties) simul-

taneously at the intersection of the
certainty-felony rate coordinates. Inspection revealed the association to
be nonlinear, with a tipping point
being reached at a 30 percent clearlevel. To illustrate, the association between arrest and rate was
found to be r = -.65 (P < .05) for
counties and r
-. 19 (P < .05) for
cities with populations of 2,500 or
more. For counties with clearance
rates above 30 percent, however, the
correlation was r = .5~, while
r = -.13 for those below this level.
Similarly, for cities the respective
coefficients are - .4~ and .19. These
findings remained basically unaltered
when a number of socioeconomic and
demographic factors were introduced as control variables.’ Examination of median offense rates of units
above and below the 30 percent level
ance

=

lent further support to the notion
that a tipping effect occurs at this
level. For counties, the total felony
rate (per 1,000 persons) is 32.5 and
11.7, respectively, for units below and
above this mark. Median figures for
cities are 33.0 and 17.8, respectively.
These findings, they argue, indicate
&dquo;that there is a critical level /30%/ that
certainty must reach before there is a
noticeable change in volume of
crime&dquo; (458). They go on to say that
their data clearly suggest that legal
sanctions can no longer be ignored as
deterrents to crime, and &dquo;perhaps the
missing link&dquo; in current etiological
thinking in criminology is the &dquo;fear of

sanction/s/&dquo; (4 1).
While Tittle and Rowe should be
commended for attempting to build
upon previous deterrence analyses,
their investigation suffers from a few
e

serious limitations. First, they solely
focus upon the certainty-rate relationship for one year (1971) in the
state of Florida. It thus remains unclear whether their findings may be
generalized to other years and areas
of the country. Second, they fail to
examine the certainty-rate question
for individual felonies. Rather, they
simply examine the relationship between cities’ and counties’ total felony
rates and the proportion of total
felonies cleared by arrest. Accordingly, it
also remains unclear how well their
findings may be generalized to different types of offenses. In this respect, it is of interest to note that Tittle
and Rowe indicate early in their dis1. The socioeconomic and demographic
variables Tittle and Rowe considered are: (1) %
male population, (2) % population aged 15-24,
(3) % male population aged 15-24, (4) % population age 65 and over, (5) size of city or % of
county living in cities 20,000 and over, (6) %
women in the labor force, (7) % population in

poverty, (8) % Negro population, (9) % nonwhite population, (10) median education, (11)
interquartile range of income.

previous deterrence investigations (including Tittle’s, 1969)
have found that the effect of certainty
varies by &dquo;the type of norm /offense/ in
question&dquo; (455). They neglect to take
cussion that

this factor into consideration in their

analysis however, nor do they even
consider this possibility in interpreting their findings.’ In short, Tittle
and Rowe’s analysis neither permits a
clear understanding of the effect of
different felonies, nor the
level of clearance required to reduce
rates for difference crimes.
THE PRESENT INVESTIGATION
The research reported here is both
a partial replication and extension of
Tittle and Rowe’s analysis. Like them,
we examine the relationship between
total felony rates and total felony
arrest rates for counties and cities of
Florida but for the year 1972. By
comparing our findings for Florida
for 1972 with theirs for 1971 it will
be possible to at least partially
examine one of the limitations noted
above. Second, by considering each
major offense separately (homicide,
rape, robbery, assault, breaking and
entering, larceny, auto theft) it will be
possible to examine the deterrent effect of arrest for each crime, and the
level of arrest required to reduce
rates for each offense. Third, we introduce into the analysis a measure of
police strength (number of police per
1000 population) as a control variable
in examining the certainty-offense
rate relati&reg;nshzp.3 While Tittle and
arrest on

2. For a comprehensive discussion of the
differential impact of legal sanctions by offense
and type of offender see: Andenaes (1974),
Zimring and Hawkins (1974), Zimring (1971),
Chambliss (1967).
3. Arrest, offense rate and police personnel
figures were secured from1972 Annual Report:
Crime In Florida, Florida Department of Law
Enforcement; Tallahassee, Florida. Tittle and
Rowe took offense and arrest clearance rate
figures from the 1971 annual Florida report.

Rowe found this

relationship to be
generally unaffected when a number
of socioeconomic and demographic
variables were examined, they failed
to consider how police manpower
may affect both clearance rates and
offense rates. To illustrate, a community with a large number of police
per capita may be able to achieve a
higher arrest clearance rate than a
community with few police. At the
same time,
however, communities
with a large number of police per
capita may also have unexpectedly
high reported offense rates (at least for
some crimes) due to the fact that; (1)
with a greater number of police, all
other things being equal, more
crimes will probably be detected first
hand by the police, i.e., fewer crimes
will go unnoticed and unrecorded,
and (2) with a greater number of
police, police visibility and availability would tend to increase, which may
result in a greater willingness of victims of crime and others to report
offenses to the authorities. Conversely, a community with few police
per capita may have a low arrest
clearance rate due to a lack of resources but a lower than expected
reported crime rate due to; (1) the
police not detecting first hand as
many offenses as they might with
more personnel, and (2) possibly less
reporting of crimes by citizens to the
authorities because of their lower visability and possible effectiveness. In
short, while for both high and low
police per capita communities the arrest clearance rate-offense rate relationship may be in the hypothesized
negative direction, the level of police
manpower may tend to distort this
relationship and drive the certaintyrate correlation in a positive direction.
In addition, the level of police
manpower may, of course, affect of-

quite apart from its effect
clearance rates. In line with
the deterrence argument, simply the
greater visibility of the police in
communities with a high per capita of
police (and the assumed greater
likelihood of detection and arrest of
would-be offenders) would have the
effect of reducing offense rates. Conversely, one would expect just the
opposite to result in communities
with a lower per capita of police.
Unfortunately, Tittle and Rowe
failed to take police strength into
consideration in their investigation so
it is simply not possible to say how this
factor may have affected their findfense

on

rates

arrest

ings.
Finally,

in this

investigation we use
of the certainty of
arrest the number of reported arrests
for each felony divided by the
number of such felonies reported by
the police. This procedure resulted in
a certainty value for each unit (city,
county), for each offense, ranging
from 0.0 to unity (1.00). A value of
as our measure

0.0 would indicate that there were no
for the offense in question
while a value of 1.00 would indicate
an equal number of offenses and
arrests. While this measure of certainty suffers from some limitations
(it does not take into consideration
what happens after arrest, i.e., rearrests

lease, prosecution, plea bargaining,
conviction, sentencing, etc.) it would

preferable to Tittle and Rowe’s
of arrest clearance percentages
which were compiled by the police as an
indicator of certainty. They note that
arrest clearance rates (which are
often used as a measure of police
efficiency), because they are compiled by the police and are a product
of police discretion, are subject to
distortion. They argue, however, that
the data are probably not greatly contaminated, and even if they are, &dquo;such
seem
use

to be distributed
the various police departments so that the validity of a
study which examines internal variations in the entire body of
data ... would be unaffected&dquo; (456).
While they may be correct that
police clearance rate figures issued by
police departments in Florida are not

bias would

seem

throughout

&dquo;greatly contaminated,&dquo; they present
evidence to support this claim. (In
fact, Tittle (1975) later concludes that
these data are proably terribly biased,
no

which quite likely is responsible for
these figures being dropped from the
Crime In Florida annual report.) Similarly, they present no evidence to
support their claim that even if such
distortion does exist, &dquo;such bias
would seem to be distributed [equally]
throughout the various police departments&dquo; (456). While we also lack
the necessary Florida data for police
departments to systematically address
this question, we cannot help but be
skeptical about their argument when
Tittle and Rowe’s data show arrest
clearance rates for cities ranging
from the extremes of less than five
percent to 100 percent.
Methods and Procedures
To address the above questions,
analysis consisted of three stages.
First, cities and counties were divided
into four groupings by level of arrest
for each felony (0-25%, 26-50%, 5175%, 76-100%) with average offense
rates computed for each grouping. In
line with deterrence theory, we would
expect a decrease in rate as the level
of certainty increases. Second,
our

a correlation analysis we
examined the effect of arrest on rates
for each felony at certainty levels
of 0-10%, 10.1-20%, 20.1-30%
...80.1-90% and 90.1 % and over.
Our concern here was to determine
the critical level of arrest required

through

for each offense
how well the 30 percent figure Tittle and Rowe suggest applies to each crirr~e.4 Third,
to examine the possible spuriousness of the relationshp between
arrest rates and offense rates, and the
influence of police strength on these
variables, partial correlations were
computed between arrests and offense rates for each felony, controlling for the number of police per
1000 population. By comparing the
zero-order and partial correlations
between arrest and offense rates, we
will be able to examine to what extent
the certainty-rate relationship is a
statistical artifact resulting from a
failure to consider police strength as
a third variable.
Before reporting the results of our
analysis, it would seem of value to
briefly reiterate a point discussed at
some length by Tittle and Rowe and
previous deterrence investigators
(Tittle, 1969; Chiricos and Waldo,
to

and

reduce
to

rates

test

1970; Logan, 1971, 1972; Bailey, eft
al., 19719 Bailey, et al., 1974) conthe possible spuriousness of
correlations that result when examining independent and dependent
variables that are ratios containing a
common term (arrest clearance rate
= # of arrests/ # crimes known to the
police; offense rate = # crimes
known to the police/ population).
Since the denominator of our inde-

cerning

4. In the absence of any established theoretical guidelines for dividing cities and counties
into groups by level of arrest, we have arbitrarily chosen the intervals that appear in Tables
1-3. Here our intention was simply to explore
the certainty-rate relationship under varying
conditions of arrest. Inspection of Tables 1-3
reveals that in some cases means, medians, and
product moment correlations were not computed due to small subsample sizes (n < 5 for
Table 1, and n < 10 for Tables 2-3). As with
cutting points for levels of certainty, cutting
points for n sizes sufficiently large to compute
test statistics were also selected arbitrarily.

pendent variable and the numerator
our dependent variable contain a
common term, it has been argued
that this would automatically produce
a negative association between the
of

variables (Chiricos and Waldo,
As pointed out in a number of
recent investigations, however, this is
not a relevant concern when &dquo;ratios
two

1970).

percent. After this point,,

containing a common term are
theoretically meaningful as ratios,&dquo; as
they are here and in Tittle and
Rowe’s (1974, 457) investigation. In percent.
addition, the indexical artifact issue is

only of concern when the elements of
the ratios

are

not

related, which of

case here nor in
Tittle and Rowe’s investigation (Logan, 1971, 1972; Bailey, et al., 1971;

course, is not the

Bailey, et al., 1974).
RESULTS

Table I reports average rates for
total felonies and individual offenses
for cities and counties of Florida by
level of arrest.
For total felonies, examination
shows mean and median offense
rates for both cities and counties to
exceed average rates for their respective units until arrest levels exceed 50

occurs

TABL.I. I

Average

ratac are not

computed

rfiere there

drop

The same general pattern
for breaking and enterbut
with
a reduction in city and
ing,
rates
county
beginning after a 25
percent level is reached.
A slightly different pattern occurs
for the remaining offenses. For robbery, city and county (median only)
rates do not fall below the average for
their respective units until arrests exceed 75 percent, while the mean rate
for counties drops below the average
after the 50 percent mark. Consistent
with deterrence theory, however,
robbery rates continue to decline for
cities and counties after the .50 level.
In contrast, for rape and murder,
mean and median rates for cities exceed the state’s average at all three
levels beyond the 0-25 percent inter-

also

M~,AN AND MI.DIAN OFH.NS~. RATt.5 FOR CITIES AND C()UNTIFS IN
FLORIDA BY LEVU. OF ARRt.ST. 1972

~*d

rates

substantially for counties and only
slightly for cities, but with a more
substantial reduction in city rates occurring after certainty exceeds 75
percent. A similar pattern occurs for
larceny and auto theft with city and
county rates dropping below the average for their respective units when
arrests exceed 50 percent, and with
an even more pronounced reduction
occurring after certainty reaches 75

are

famar than five ca&reg;e&reg;.

val. For both offenses, however, rates
decline for units exceeding a 50 percent arrest level. A somewhat similar
pattern holds for counties with murder and rape rates being below total
county averages for units in the 0-25
percent range and with generally average or above average rates for
those falling in the 26-75 percent
arrest range. As with robbery, however, rates of murder and rape decline after certainty exceeds 75 per-

As noted above, Tittle and Rowe
found a product moment correlation
of - .65 for counties ~nd -.19 for
cities for 1971. For 1972, the respective coefficients ~re -.631 (P < .001)
and -.190 (P < .01). As Table I
would suggest, however, the
certainty-rate relationship is not uniform for each offense. For assaults,
breaking and entering, larceny and
auto theft, the coefficients are very
comparable to those for total felonies.
This is not the case for murder, forcible rape and robbery, however. Of
these three felonies, only the coefficient for murder (counties) is in the
predicted negative direction, with the
remaining correlations being positive. Even the county coefficient for
murder, however, is much less substantial than that for total felonies. In
short, while the findings for total
felonies provide a reasonably good
indicator of the certainty-rate relationship for some offenses, levels of
arrest would appear much less important for those crimes commonly
thought to be least subject to deter-

cent.

In sum, Table I indicates a nonlinear association between arrest and
offense rates for both total and individual felonies. The form of the nonlinear relationship is not uniform,
however, for each offense, with rates
taking a downturn at different levels
of certainty.
To further examine the certaintyrate relationship, correlations were
computed between arrest and offense
rates for individual and total felonies.
Results of this analysis are reported
for counties and cities in the last
columns of Tables 2 and 3, respec-

tively.

rence

(murder, rape, robbery).

IABU 2
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&dquo;correlation@
1II’1f*Correlation&oelig;
a

p

P G ,OS

b

P

P<

C

P

P < .001

.01

could not be
are not

computed

computed

for

due to
n

no

variation

sines belov 10.

(a

zero

rate)

in the

dependent

variable.

The next stage of our analysis consisted of examining the relationship
between arrest and offense rates for
cities and counties falling above and
below various levels of arrest. Results
are reported in columns 3-11 of
Tables 2 and 3.
These data reveal a picture generally consistent with deterrence
theory with the exception of two offenses. For robbery, larceny and auto
theft the correlations are all in the
predicted negative direction for cities
and counties falling above each level
of clearance. For units falling below
low levels of arrest the coefficients
are positive, but as certainty -levels
increase these positive correlations
are reduced in size with some becoming negative at higher levels of arrest.
A similar pattern holds for assault,
breaking and entering and total
felonies but only for cities. In contrast, but also consistent with deterrence theory, the county correlations
for these offenses are negative (with
one exception) both for units falling
above and below each level of arrest.

The pattern of correlations for
murder and forcible rape is generally
inconsistent with the above offenses.
While for murder (cities) the overall
correlation between arrest and rate is
positive and quite substantial (r =
.635), the coefficients for units above
each certainty level are consistently
low-negative, and positive for units
below each level. Examination of the
scattergrams for these data reveal
that the overall positive correlation
between arrest and rate is a statistical
artifact of a positive distribution of
clusters of negatively correlated cases
at each level of clearance. Examination of county correlations for murder reveals a similar statistical artifact, but with the bias in the opposite direction. Here the overall correlation for all counties is low-negative
(r = -.201) while the correlations for
units above each certainty level are

consistently low-positive.
For forcible rape, a mixed pattern
result.s. With but two exceptions
(80%, 90%) the county correlations
are in the predicted negative direc-

1 ABLE 3

<1()RRFLATII)N
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&dquo;Correlations could not be computed due to
~Correlatfona are .-.ot cmputed !or r. ~~!!:&eth;8
ep<

.05

bPC

,OI

.:

, P .00_

no

vsriation (a zaro

below 10.

rate)

in eha

dependent vln:~.b16.

tion for

cases

above each level of

the zero-order correlations between

certainty, with all coefficients being the rate variables with the partial
positive for units falling below each coefficients that result when the
level. Unlike robbery, larceny, auto police variable is introduced, we will
theft, assault (cities only) breaking be able to examine the possible spuriand entering and total felonies (cities ousness of the certainty-offense rate
only), however, the size of these posi- relationship. Table 4 reports the retive correlations is not reduced as sults of this analysis.
If the zero-order arrest offensecertainty increases, nor do they become negative at higher levels of arrate coefficients (columns 2 and 4)
statistical artifact of

control-

rest.

are a

Finally, for cities the pattern of
positive correlations for forcible rape
is completely contrary to deterrence
theory. For units falling above each
level of certainty, the correlations in-

ling for police manpower, then controlling for this third variable should

crease in size and do not decrease as
the level of arrest increases. In addition, like murder (cities only), the size
of the positive correlations for units
below each level of certainty is not
reduced as level of arrest increases.
The final stage of our analysis consisted of examining the relationship
between arrest rates and offense rates
controlling for the level of police
(number of police per 1000 population). As noted above, by comparing

not

reduce the size of the coefficients
(columns 3 and 5). If on the other
hand, the certainty-rate relationship
is independent of the level of police
manpower, the coefficients should
remain unchanged. For both counties
and cities, Table 4 shows the zeroorder and partial coefficients to be
very similar in size. For counties, with
the exception of forcible rape and
robbery, the correlations are slightly
reduced when the police variable is
considered. For forcible rape, the
positive coefficient (r .157) slightly
increased (r
.260) when the control
=

=

TABLE 4
ZERO-ORDER AND PARTIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COUNTY AND
CITY ARREST RATES AND OFFENSE RATES, 1972

a = p < .05
b = p < .01
c=p<.001

variable is introduced, while for robbery, the correlation changes from a

positive (r

=

.136)

to a

negative sign

(r = -.036).
For cities

a somewhat similar patresults. While for four offenses
(forcible rape, robbery, assault, total
felonies) the partial correlations are
slightly smaller than their zero-order
counterparts, just the opposite occurs
for the remaining offenses (murder,
breaking and entering, larceny, auto
theft) when the control variable is
introduced. In all cases, however, the
bivariate and partial correlations are
very similar in size, and like the
county data, tests of significance show
the two sets of coefficients not to
differ significantly (P < .05) for any
offense. Accordingly, we may reject
the hypothesis that the observed relationship between arrest rates and offense rates is spuriously produced by
the level of the police in a commu-

tern

nity.
SUMMARY

AND

CONCLUSION

we have atbuild upon some of the
limitations of Tittle and Rowe’s
examination of the role of legal sanctions as a deterrent to crime. As in
their analysis, we examine the effect
of arrest on total felony rates and
attempt to identify the level of cer-

In this

tempted

investigation

to

tainty (apprehension) required

to re-

examine the
some crimes are more
that
argument
subject to deterrence than others, the
effect of certainty is examined separately for seven major felonies to determine the level of arrest required to
reduce rates for each offense. Finally,

duce

rates.

Second,

to

a measure of police manpower is introduced as a control variable to test
for the possible spuriousness of the
certainty of arrest-offense rate results.
Both our findings and Tittle and
Rowe’s lend support to the argument
that the law-the threat of legal
sanctions-can no longer be ignored
in considerations of the etiology of
crime. As expected, however, our
data indicate that the threat of arrest
does not have a uniform deterrent
effect for all felonies. For offenses
commonly considered to be &dquo;instrumental&dquo; in nature, arrest would appear to be a much more important
determinant of the level of crime
than for &dquo;expressive&dquo; crimes
(Chambliss, 1967). This finding is
quite consistent with the deterrence
argument for, as Tittle and Rowe
(1974, 460) point out, &dquo;classical
criminologists recognized that the
motivation to engage in various acts
differs as does the motivation of differcnt. individuals with respect to the
same act.&dquo;
In conclusion, the investigation reported here permits a more refined
examination of the deterrence question than that provided by Tittle and
Rowe and lends additional support to
their argument that. more attention
needs to be focused upon restraint
factors in deviance theory. As they
also point out, however, many factors
remain to be examined in developing
a better understanding of deterrence.
We consider this investigation as but
one step in this direction and urge
others to continue to explore this

important area.
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